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Abstract
In a number of observed procurements, the buyer has employed an auction format that allows
for a split-award outcome. We focus on settings where the range of uncertainty regarding scale
economies is large and, depending on cost realizations, the eﬃcient allocations include split-
award outcomes as well as sole-source outcomes (one active supplier). We examine the price
performance and eﬃciency properties of split-award auctions in relation to equilibrium bidding
under asymmetric information. In equilibrium, both award outcomes occur: the split-award
outcome occurs only when it minimizes total costs; sole-source outcomes, however, occur too
often from an eﬃciency viewpoint. With respect to prices, equilibrium bids involve pooling at
a common price for the split award, and separation for sole-source awards. The pooling region
reduces bidding pressure and allows for relatively high sole-source prices. We provide conditions
under which the buyer and suppliers all beneﬁt from a split-award format relative to a winner-
take-all unit auction format. Our results are consistent with data on US defense procurement
auctions.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
We often observe procurements in which a buyer employs an auction format that allows for a split-
award outcome. Split-award auctions are used frequently in defense procurement, where examples
include ﬁghter engines, missiles and submarines. Procurement contracts that divide production
awards across suppliers are also very common in the private sector. A prominent recent example
involves Singapore Airlines who simultaneously solicited bids from Boeing and Airbus and chose to
purchase from both.1 A number of commercial buyers have also begun to use Web-based bidding
processes that result in divided production awards.2 Together with other public and private sector
procurements, these examples highlight an important and recurrent problem in procurement, namely,
the appropriate format for competition among suppliers. At a basic level, this involves a choice
between competition on a ‘winner-take-all’ basis, where only one ﬁrm produces, or competition
that allows for split awards, where multiple ﬁrms produce. In addition to procurement, this is an
important issue for a number of regulated industries in which the potential for multiple-provider
service exists (e.g. cable TV and managed competition in health care). With regard to basic
eﬃciency considerations, we expect scale economies to favor winner-take-all while scale diseconomies
favor split awards. In practice, however, there are serious information problems associated with an
ex ante determination of the extent of scale economies.3
In this paper we focus on environments with asymmetric cost information where the range of
uncertainty is large enough that eﬃcient allocations include both sole-source awards (all items to
one supplier) and split awards. We examine the price performance and eﬃciency properties of split-
award auctions in this setting. Our analysis provides an equilibrium view of the bidding incentives
and allows us to address several questions and concerns that have been raised about observed prices
and outcomes. While a number of oﬃcials and observers have been enthusiastic about the auction
results, several others have been critical. A common concern regarding bidding incentives in a split-
award format is the potential use of a ‘bid-to-lose’ strategy in which a supplier chooses not to bid
aggressively but rather to submit ‘high’ bid prices for the sole-source award and aim at obtaining only
a share of the total award with more competitive bids for split-award outcomes.4 In our analysis, we
examine how the incentives to bid for a split and a sole-source award are related to both each other
and the extent of scale economies, and we assess the impact on the buyer and suppliers’ welfare.
The model, which is based on Anton and Yao [2], involves a procurement auction where two
1In the private sector, other procurements involving split awards include General Motors (auto parts), and IBM
(computer chips); for additional examples and discussion, see Burnett and Kovacic [8] and Anton and Yao [2]. In the
public sector, defense remains the most important single application (see Rogerson [26]).
2For additional examples along these lines, see recent work on supply chains in the operation management literature,
including Elmaghraby [11], Tunca and Wu [27] and Bernstein and de Vericourt [6].
3A number of competing forces are often present. Burnett and Kovacic [8] discuss several, including learning eﬀects,
spillovers, duplication of ﬁxed assets, technology transfer costs, and incentives for cost minimization.
4Pyatt [24], for example, describes favorable outcomes and dollar beneﬁts for a number of speciﬁc projects; Beltramo
[4] and Meeker [22] are more critical. Burnett and Kovacic [8] as well as Pyatt [24] discuss the ‘bid-to-lose’ issue further.
2suppliers submit sealed bids to a buyer who seeks to procure a ﬁxed total number of items.5 A
bid speciﬁes two prices, one for supplying all of the items (sole-source award) and one for supplying
the split quantity (split award). Each each supplier has private cost information. Once the bids
are submitted, the buyer chooses an award that minimizes the total payment to the bidders. This
auction format allows for discriminatory pricing and, as the buyer chooses optimally ex post,t h e
award scheme is consistent with a limited ability to commit for the buyer.
The fundamental departure from Anton and Yao [2] is the presence of scale economies. In
that analysis, the split is always ﬁrst-best eﬃcient (global diseconomies of scale) and only the split
is awarded in equilibrium. In the present paper, scale economies are present hence the eﬃcient
award choice now depends crucially on the aggregation of the privately observed cost information
held by the individual suppliers. As we show, scale economies have a strong eﬀect on the bidding
equilibrium and may lead to ineﬃcient outcomes. In addition, the present framework allows us to
address the ‘bid-to-lose’ eﬀect noted above, since sole-source outcomes occur in equilibrium with
positive probability.
Our main results are as follows. We identify a set of equilibria parametrized by a threshold
type that demarcates the range of split outcomes from sole-source ones. This set also includes the
equilibrium of the standard one-unit auction as a special case. In general, the sole-sourcing outcome
occurs too often from an eﬃciency viewpoint. Thus, price competition in a split-award auction allows
the buyer and suppliers to capture some but not all of the available eﬃciency gains.
In equilibrium, bidding involves pooling at a common split price for an interval of high cost
types, and separation with a sole-source award for low cost types. Intuitively, the incentive to bid
aggressively and undercut an opponent is stronger for a supplier (cost type) when a sole-source award
is likely to be eﬃcient. In contrast, this incentive is muted when the split outcome is likely to be
eﬃcient, because this allows both suppliers to earn a positive proﬁt( f o ra l lc o s tt y p e s ) .A si nA n t o n
and Yao [2], pooling at a common split price can be viewed as an implicit form of equilibrium bidding
coordination.
Turning to the welfare properties, we provide conditions under which a split-award auction
format generates a Pareto improvement over the winner-take-all auction format. The unit auction
is useful as a benchmark because it is commonly employed in practice and, with splits excluded by
deﬁnition, it helps to isolate the diﬀerential eﬀect of split outcomes. We ﬁnd that the buyer pays
a lower price in the range of split outcomes, but a higher price in the sole-source range (relative to
bid prices in the unit auction). Thus, when the likelihood of a split outcome is suﬃciently large, the
buyer will pay a lower expected price.
At the same time, supplier proﬁts (interim) are also higher. Because a split can occur only when
it is cost eﬃcient relative to a sole-source outcome, supplier proﬁts in the split range can exceed the
corresponding proﬁts in a unit auction (where a supplier who wins must produce the full production
5The model is structured to capture several essential features of split-award auctions as conducted by the U.S.
Government; for more on this point, see Anton and Yao [2]. See, also, the discussion in Burnett and Kovacic [8],
regarding legislative reforms and mandates for a competitive procurement format.
3award). As noted above, higher bid prices over the sole-source range necessarily improve supplier
proﬁts. Thus, suppliers in each range earn higher proﬁts. Intuitively, the joint surplus for a Pareto
improvement is provided by the eﬃciency gains in the split region. Although pooling in the split
region allows prices in the sole-source region to be higher, the eﬃciency gains allow for relatively
lower prices in the split region and all parties can beneﬁt in equilibrium.
These results provide a useful framework for evaluating the performance of split-award auctions.
First, two features of equilibrium bids in the split range are consistent with a bid-to-lose interpre-
tation. Due to pooling, the split price does not vary with realized cost types and, therefore, lower
cost bidders are not more aggressive. Further, in the split range the suppliers do submit a ‘high’
bid price for a sole-source award and this is designed to steer the buyer towards the split. However,
even though pooling at a common price represents a form of equilibrium bidding coordination and
suppliers earn relatively higher proﬁts, this is not necessarily an undesirable outcome for the buyer.
This is because the split is the equilibrium award only when it is eﬃcient and the price structure
allows the buyer to share in the eﬃciency gains.
The second point concerns prices in the sole-source range. Suppose, for example, a buyer found
that prices for sole-source awards in a split-award format exceeded those when the procurement was
conducted on a winner-take-all basis. Here, it would be wrong to take this as evidence of poor overall
price performance. Rather, we would expect such a price shift (as part of a Pareto improvement)
and a full evaluation would weight this as a partial oﬀset to savings over the split range.
In the literature, our paper relates most directly with two streams of work. First, beginning
with the work of Wilson [29] on share auctions, several studies focus on explicit bidding strategies
for auctions with divisible or multiple objects. For the case of full information (among bidders),
Bernheim and Whinston [5] examine menu auctions and Anton and Yao [1] examine split-award
auctions. As noted above, Anton and Yao [2] consider incomplete information and study equilibrium
bidding when a split award is full-information eﬃcient. Klotz and Chatterjee [14] study a model of
repeated procurement with costly entry. Perry and S´ akovics [23] consider a similar problem but a
diﬀerent auction format and with bidders with constant returns to scale. They analyze a sequential
auction in which a procurement contract is split into two possibly asymmetric parts and a bidder can
only win one of the two parts. Their emphasis is on the optimal size of the two sub-contracts and on
the eﬀects on entry of the sequential auction format with respect to a pure single-source auction. In
these papers, as in our own, the emphasis is on a positive analysis of equilibrium in a speciﬁc auction
format.6
The second stream of related work deals with regulation and monopoly versus duopoly market
structure. This includes Auriol and Laﬀont [3], Dana and Spier [9], and McGuire and Riordan
[20].7 These papers examine optimal regulatory policy and auction design and assess the impact of
6For related work involving market experiments see Davis and Wilson [10] and Li and Plott [16]. On the empirical
side, see the analysis of cost savings from dual sourcing in defense procurement by Lyons [17].
7See, also, Riordan [25] in which a buyer chooses the number of qualiﬁed suppliers, and Wolinsky [28] where the
market structure can vary continuously between monopoly and duopoly.
4asymmetric cost information on the extent of monopoly or duopoly allowed in the market.8 Relative
to the ﬁrst stream of work, there is more emphasis on normative dimensions and a stronger set
of assumptions regarding the commitment abilities of the buyer. Note that the monopoly versus
duopoly distinction corresponds (roughly) to a sole-source versus a split award.
On the closely related topic of market design, McMillan [21] provides an excellent recent discus-
sion of theory and policy. Taking inspiration from his discussion of defense procurement, we examine
bidding data from defense contractors in relation to our equilibrium analysis. Based on the actual
set of submitted bid prices for several award rounds, we ﬁnd that the bids exhibit several properties
that are consistent with an equilibrium interpretation of the ‘bid-to-lose’ strategy noted above.
We present the model in Section 2. The bidding equilibrium, our primary result, is presented
and discussed in Section 3. The welfare analysis is carried out in Section 4. Next, we examine the
bidding data. We conclude in Section 6. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Model
We examine a sealed-bid, low-price auction format in which a buyer seeks to procure a given total
quantity, normalized to one unit, from two suppliers, i = A,B. All parties are risk neutral and the
suppliers are ex ante symmetric. The three possible auction awards are denoted by SSA,S S B, and
Σ. At the ‘sole-source’ award SSi, ﬁrm i supplies one unit while ﬁrm j 6= i supplies zero. At the
‘split’ award Σ,e a c hﬁrm supplies the buyer one-half of the quantity. With three potential awards,
the split-award auction is as simple as possible.
Let θi and C(θi) be the total cost of supplier i of producing a quantity of one and one-half,
respectively, where θi is private information of supplier i. The cost parameter for each supplier is an





. We assume that for each type costs increase with quantity: θ>C(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.
Implicitly, we are setting the cost of no production to zero, so θ and C (θ) should be interpreted as
the increase in cost with respect to a status quo of supplying zero to the buyer. Next, we assume
that 0 <C 0 (θ) < 1h o l d sf o ra l lθ ∈ Θ. Intuitively, this means that “marginal cost” shifts up with θ,
as higher cost types have a greater cost of supplying the increased quantity (from 0 to 1
2,a n df r o m
1
2 to 1).
Our third cost assumption is pivotal for scale economies and formalizes the notion that the range
of cost uncertainty is signiﬁcant. Let H (θA,θ B) denote the cost diﬀerence between SSA or SSB,
whichever has lower costs, and Σ across the range of cost types, i.e.
H (θA,θ B) ≡ min{θA,θ B} − [C (θA)+C (θB)]. (1)
Intuitively, H is a direct measure of the eﬃciency gains that are generated by the possibility of
8Laﬀont and Tirole [15] discuss mechanism design and dual sourcing in this context. Maskin and Riley [19] treat
the problem of designing a multiple object auction when buyer valuations are concave in quantity, so that eﬃciency
favors dividing the award (equally, for equal valuations).
5awarding split production. We make the following assumption.









The assumption implies that the cost range is so large that each award is eﬃcient for some pair




> 0h o l d sf o rθ>θ m, diseconomies of scale are present and Σ is
eﬃcient for suﬃciently high types. These cost assumptions are suﬃcient for the bidding analysis
that follows. Narrowly interpreted, they pertain to production costs. More generally, however, a
variety of reduced form interpretations are possible. We discuss these and develop the eﬃciency
properties in more detail further below.
A bid in the auction is an ordered-pair (p,pΣ), where p is the sole-source price at which a supplier
oﬀers to deliver one unit and pΣ is the split price at which one half is oﬀered. In response to bids of
(p,pΣ)a n d(ˆ p, ˆ pΣ) submitted by i and j, respectively, the buyer chooses the auction award SSA,S S B
or Σ that achieves min{p,pΣ +ˆ pΣ, ˆ p}, so that for any submitted bids the buyer chooses the award
with the lowest total price. In the event of a tie the buyer is indiﬀerent between two or more awards.
We assume that ties are broken in favor of splitting, that is whenever min{p, ˆ p} = p +ˆ pΣ each ﬁrm
supplies 1
2. All our results hold for any tie-breaking rule, and this particular rule is chosen only to
simplify the presentation. We leave unspeciﬁed the tie-breaking rule when the two sole-source bids
are identical and strictly less than p +ˆ pΣ.
To specify payoﬀs, suppose supplier i submits a bid (p,pΣ)w h i l ej submits (ˆ p, ˆ pΣ). Then, for a
realized cost type of θi, the payoﬀ function for bidder i induced by the auction rules satisﬁes




0i f ˆ p<min{p,pΣ +ˆ pΣ};
pΣ − C(θi)i f pΣ +ˆ pΣ ≤ min{p, ˆ p};
p − θ if p<min{ˆ p,pΣ +ˆ pΣ}.
(2)
We examine symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibria (hereafter, bidding equilibria) for this auction game.





+.T h u s ,
we seek a bidding strategy (P,PΣ) such that










Before turning to the derivation the bidding equilibrium set, we describe, and illustrate in Figure 1
below, the full information eﬃcient award choice. This is useful for our bidding and welfare analysis.









type square, while a sole-source award is eﬃcient otherwise. Figure 1 provides















Figure 1: Eﬃcient Allocation
When both suppliers are ‘high cost’ types, each above θm,w eh a v eH>0 and the split minimizes
costs. This is due to the presence of diseconomies of scale for each supplier in this range of cost
types.
Scale economies come into play when at least one supplier is a ‘low cost’ type, below θm and a
sole-source award is eﬃcient outside a band around the 45◦ line. Here, a large diﬀerence in θA and
θB translates into a large cost advantage. Scale economies can arise in a procurement setting when
experience is a dominant inﬂuence on costs. Another eﬀect, analyzed in Auriol and Laﬀont [3] and
Klotz and Chatterjee [14], is the duplication of ﬁxed costs which may arise with two producers.
Formally, the above cost assumptions imply that there is a lower threshold type θ ,w h e r e
θ ≤ θ  <θ m, such that only sole-source awards are eﬃcient when both θA and θB are below θ .I n
t h em i d d l er a n g e ,θ  <θ<θ m, there is a critical opponent type, T (θ), such that
H (θ,T (θ)) = θ − C (θ) − C (T (θ)) = 0.
The function T is deﬁned over the range (θ ,θ m); it is continuous, strictly increasing and it satisﬁes
T (θ) >θand T (θm)=θ. Essentially, T (θ)t r a c e so u tt h ee ﬃciency boundary between split and
sole-source awards. If θB >T(θA)t h e nas o l e - s o u r c ea w a r df o rA is eﬃcient; if T (θA) >θ B >θ A,
then the split is eﬃcient. Figure 1 displays the case of θ  >θin which T(θ )=θ , but the case
θ  = θ is also possible, depending on the shape of the cost function C.
To summarize, the existence of the critical type θm captures formally the notion that the range
of cost uncertainty is signiﬁcant. The split award Σ is necessarily eﬃcient for high cost types. For low
cost types, eﬃciency necessarily involves sole-source awards when cost types are suﬃciently far apart,
7a n di ti sp o s s i b l et h a te ﬃciency requires a sole-source award for types that are close (or identical) in
value. Thus, each award is eﬃcient for some realized cost types.
3 Equilibrium Bidding
In this section we characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies. The structure of prices is discussed
ﬁrst, and this is followed by an examination of the threshold type that demarcates the separating
and pooling regions of each equilibrium. Equilibrium awards are then considered relative to eﬃcient
awards and the role of prices in supporting the equilibrium is discussed. Finally, we discuss how the
equilibrium relates to the bid-to-lose eﬀect.
The structure of the bidding equilibrium is motivated by the relationship between eﬃcient awards
and costs. Intuitively, we might expect high cost types to submit bids that are more likely to induce
the buyer to choose the split, as costs are lower when each supplier produces the split quantity. For
low cost types, eﬃciency considerations point to sole-source awards, hence we expect such suppliers
to bid aggressively for the full award.




denote a ﬁxed threshold level, and suppose that the equilibrium award is Σ when both suppliers are
‘high cost’ relative to τ, i.e. min{θA,θ B} >τ ; and a sole-source award when at least one supplier
is ‘low cost’ relative to τ,i . e .m i n {θA,θ B} ≤ τ. Suppose further that the price Pτ
Σ oﬀered by the
bidders is constant, and that the bidding function Pτ (θ) for the sole-source award is continuous.
In equilibrium the bid prices must make τ, the threshold type, indiﬀerent between a split-
award and a sole-source award. This is necessary with a continuum of types. With a sole-source
award the expected payoﬀ is [1 − F (τ)][Pτ (τ) − τ], since the sole-source award is won only when the
opponent’s type is θ>τ. Similarly, with a split award the expected payoﬀ is [1 − F (τ)][Pτ
Σ − C (τ)].
This leads to the condition
Pτ (τ) − τ = Pτ
Σ − C (τ). (4)
In words, the sole-source price at τ must exceed the split price by exactly the incremental production
cost for τ between split and full production. Furthermore, the continuity of the function Pτ (θ)
implies that in equilibrium the buyer must be indiﬀerent between choosing the split or a sole-source
award at the threshold, that is
Pτ (τ)=2 Pτ
Σ. (5)
Together, these two properties pin down the split price, as a function of the threshold type τ,a t
Pτ
Σ ≡ τ − C (τ). (6)
Thus, in all bidding equilibria of the type we are discussing the oﬀer for the split-award price must
be given by (6) for all types θ ≥ τ, that is types which may receive the split award with positive
probability. Types θ<τnever win a split award, and any price PΣ ≥ τ − C (τ) would support the
outcome. For simplicity we assume that all types oﬀer τ − C (τ) as split-award price.













2[τ − C (τ)] if θ ≥ τ.
(7)
The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibria parameterized by τ.





Σ),w h e r ePτ
Σ is given by (6) and Pτ is given by
(7), is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
The buyer chooses the award with the lowest total price and, for these bid prices, ﬁnds it optimal to
follow the award pattern described above. Thus, the equilibrium award is Σ when both suppliers are
high cost types, and the (interim) expected payoﬀ for θ>τis Π(θ)=[ Pτ
Σ − C (θ)][1 − F (τ)]. A
low cost type receives a sole-source award whenever the other supplier is a higher cost type, thus for
θ ≤ τ we have Π(θ)=[ Pτ (θ) − θ][1− F (θ)]. Split prices from low cost types and sole-source prices
from high cost types are ‘oﬀ the equilibrium path’ and play a role in supporting the equilibrium.
In equilibrium low cost types separate while high cost types pool at a constant split price Pτ
Σ.
Low cost suppliers face a negative trade-oﬀ between a higher sole-source price and the probability
of winning a sole-source award. In equilibrium the sole-source price, Pτ (θ), rises with θ while the
probability, 1 − F (θ), declines. In contrast, this trade-oﬀ is absent for high cost types, as both the
probability of a split award, 1 − F (τ), and the split-award price Pτ
Σ are constant.




indexes a family of equilibria. Letting τ → θ,w es e ef r o m
(7) that Pτ converges to the familiar bidding equilibrium of a standard single object auction. To
understand the structure of Pτ when τ<θ, consider the separate terms in (7). If we exclude the
ﬁrst term in the ratio in (7), then sole-source prices for low cost types would reduce to the bid price
in a unit auction (for the full quantity) when the range of types is [θ,τ]. Thus, this term adjusts
sole-source prices to account for the incentives created by the presence of the split award, Σ.
The relationship between the split price and the threshold depends on bidding incentives and
eﬃciency. A comparison with the bidding equilibria in Anton and Yao [2] helps to identify this
interaction. In that analysis, the cost structure is such that the split is always eﬃcient and always




and eliminate the ones
below τ, the equilibrium bids in Anton and Yao [2] also involve pooling at a constant split price. In




and τ − C (τ) can support this equilibrium.
This degree of freedom is eliminated in the present context by the occurrence of sole-source
outcomes in equilibrium. Reintroducing types below τ, we see from Proposition 1 that the split
price must now be τ − C (τ). Signiﬁcantly, it is the ‘high’ split price that emerges in equilibrium.
As argued above, this is because the type τ must be indiﬀerent between the split and a sole-source
award; otherwise, low cost types could proﬁtably raise sole-source prices. Thus, relative to Anton
and Yao [2], sole-source outcomes occur in equilibrium and the bidding incentives of low cost types
pin down the equilibrium split price.
9Now consider the range for τ. The lower bound θm reﬂects the eﬃciency distinction between











≥ 0 and, consequently, θm ≤ τ.O t h e r w i s e ,i f τ were
below θm, the split would be ineﬃcient for τ, and the split price would induce low cost types (around
τ) to exploit the underlying scale economy and deviate to capture a sole-source award instead of
the split. Thus, the presence of scale economies limits the extent to which the split can occur in
equilibrium.
Since Σ is the eﬃcient award when min{θA,θ B} ≥ θm, we see that whenever Σ is the equilibrium
award it is also the (full information) eﬃcient award. Sole source awards, however, occur too often in
equilibrium (relative to the ﬁrst best). When τ>θ m, types between θm and τ receive a sole-source
award when the other supplier is also a high cost type, but the split is the eﬃcient award in this
case. Further, for types below θm we know that the split is eﬃcient when the type pair lies inside
the eﬃciency boundary, as given by T. This leads to the following.
Corollary 1 Equilibrium award allocations have a strict bias in favor of sole-source awards relative
to the eﬃcient allocation.
The last comment relates to a ‘bid-to-lose’ eﬀect. In equilibrium, high cost types pool at a common
split price and submit sole-source prices that the buyer will ﬁnd unattractive. This implicit coordi-
nation on the split supports positive proﬁts for all types. In our equilibrium we have speciﬁed the
sole-source bid for types θ ≥ τ to be constant at 2Pτ
Σ, which is barely enough for the buyer to prefer
the split award, but in fact here we have some freedom in selecting the bids. It is not diﬃcult to
construct bidding equilibria in which Pτ (θ) > 2Pτ
Σ for θ ≥ τ;t h i sc o n ﬁrms that our tie-breaking
rule giving preference to splits is not crucial for our results
Low-cost types receive only sole-source awards in equilibrium, and for them split-award prices are
irrelevant (as long as they are high enough). Here too there is some degree of freedom in selecting
the strategies supporting the outcome, in the sense that types θ<τcould announce split prices
pτ
Σ (θ) >Pτ
Σ. Notice further that sole-source prices are not necessarily “aggressive.” The presence of
the term H (τ,τ)
1−F(τ)
1−F(θ) in (7), which is strictly positive whenever τ<θ, implies that sole-source
prices exceed bid prices in a corresponding unit auction. What happens here is that the rents created
by the split at constant prices for high-cost types must increase the incentive rents for the low cost
types.
4 Welfare Properties
The main goal of this section is to identify conditions under which the split-award auction is Pareto




, let V (τ)
denote the ex ante expected payment for the buyer and Π(θ,τ) denote the interim expected proﬁt




Σ (1 − Fτ)
2 + H (τ,τ)Fτ (1 − Fτ)+
Z τ
θ











[τ − C (τ) − C (θ)](1 − Fτ), for θ ≥ τ;
H (τ,τ)(1− Fτ)+
R τ
θ [1 − F (x)]dx, for θ<τ .
(9)
As previously observed, when τ → θ both the payment and proﬁt functions converge to those of the
standard single object auction.
4.1 An Example
Suppose that the distribution is such that F (θ)=( θ − 1)
2 for θ ∈ [1,2], and the cost function is
C (θ)=.4θ.I nt h i sc a s ew eh a v eθm =1 .33, hence the interval [1.33, 2] is the range for the threshold
parameter τ.
For the buyer, from (8), we have V (τ)=1 .2τ −(τ −1)4[.4τ −.2]. For a unit auction benchmark
(τ = 2), the buyer pays V (2) = 1.8 and, over all τ, the lowest buyer payment is V (1.33) = 1.66;
as long as τ ≤ 1.52, we have V (τ) <V(2). It is easy to check that V (τ)i sc o n c a v ei nτ for this
example. Thus, at relatively low values for τ the buyer has a lower expected payment than in a unit
auction.
For low cost types, we use (9) to calculate the proﬁtd i ﬀerential between the equilibrium with
τ and the unit-auction benchmark, and ﬁnd Π(θ,τ) − Π(θ,2) = 1.2τ − (τ − 1)
2 (.53τ − .33) − 1.6,
which is positive for τ>1.48 and reaches a maximum at τ =1 .75. The proﬁtd i ﬀerential for high
c o s tt y p e s( w h i c hd o e sv a r yw i t hθ) is positive whenever the low cost diﬀerential is positive. Thus,
for relatively high values of τ all supplier types earn greater interim proﬁts than in a unit auction.
Combining these results, we see that the bidding equilibrium for τ =1 .5 yields a Pareto im-
provement for the buyer and the suppliers (for all θ)r e l a t i v et oau n i ta u c t i o n .W et h u sa s kw h a t
factors determine the existence of a Pareto improvement over a unit auction.
4.2 General Properties of Prices and Proﬁts
Intuitively, any Pareto improvement must be the result of gains from trade that arise when the split
award is the eﬃcient choice. In turn, equilibrium bids must involve a price structure that transfers
some of these gains to the buyer. Thus, we focus on bid prices and how they relate to V and Π over
the range of τ.
Consider ﬁrst how bid prices compare when τ is close to θ. We know the split price Pτ
Σ = τ−C (τ)




as we vary τ, and the payment by the buyer is 2Pτ
Σ








11In a single-unit auction the bid rises smoothly to a bid price of θ from the type θ.T h e r e f o r e2 Pτ
Σ





θ =2[ θr − C (θr)]. (10)
This implies that, when τ>θ r, split-award bidding equilibria have high prices for the buyer relative
to a unit auction. To see this, ﬁx τ above θr, and consider the bids from θ types above τ.T h e n2 Pτ
Σ
exceeds θ and, hence, it exceeds the unit auction bid price for each θ type where θ>τ .T h es a m e
holds for θ ≤ τ:f r o m2 Pτ
Σ > θ and (7), we see that sole-source prices exceed the unit auction bid
price for θ ≤ τ. Figure 2 provides a graph of the situation: for τH >θ r the equilibrium bid prices
















Figure 2: Equilibrium Bid Functions
The range of τ<θ r is associated with relatively lower prices for the buyer. As τ falls below θr,2 Pτ
Σ
falls below θ. The result, as illustrated with the ‘low’ τL threshold in Figure 2, is that unit auction
bid prices from types near θ are now greater than 2P
τL
Σ , and this works to the buyer’s beneﬁt.
In the next proposition we state a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for a the expected price
to be lower in a split-award auction than in a single unit auction.




for the threshold θ (i.e., winner-
take-all format), and V (τ) for the threshold τ.L e tθr be the unique solution to (10). Then:
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As discussed above, if τ ≥ θr then the equilibrium prices in the split-award auction are higher than in
the winner-take-all format for each value of θ. It follows that a necessary condition for the expected
price to be lower is τ<θ r.
To gain intuition for the suﬃcient condition presented in point 2 it is worth exploring a few
variations. First, consider the distribution of cost types and the eﬀect of shifting mass to the right
within the high cost range. Let F1 and F2 be two distribution functions that satisfy F1 (τ)=F2 (τ)
and F1 (θ) ≤ F2 (θ)f o rθ>τ .T h u s ,F1 and F2 have the same total mass in each of the low cost
and high cost ranges, but with F1 “higher” high cost types are more likely (ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance over the high cost range). Because the integral term is larger under F1,t h es u ﬃcient
condition becomes easier to satisfy.
To see the economic force at work here, note that the buyer pays 2Pτ
Σ for the split award and
this price is independent of the distribution above the threshold of τ. In contrast, supplier rents in
a unit auction depend on the distribution and all supplier types earn greater rents under F1 due to
the rightward shift of mass above τ. Thus, the buyer beneﬁts relative to a unit auction when the
distribution places more weight at the top of the cost type range.
Next, consider the eﬀect of varying the relative cost diﬀerence between sole-source awards and
the split award. To do this, we focus on H (τ,τ)i nt h es u ﬃcient condition and suppose that C (τ)
declines. Then the left-hand side increases and the suﬃcient condition is harder to satisfy. In other
words, as the split becomes more cost eﬃcient, the buyer does not beneﬁt relative to a unit auction.
This may seem counterintuitive as one might expect the buyer to share directly in any such eﬃciency
gain. To see why not, recall that Pτ
Σ = τ − C (τ) is set to remove the bidding incentive of type τ to
deviate and capture a sole-source award, and this depends on the incremental cost between split and
sole-source production rather than the split cost by itself. Thus, Pτ
Σ rises by the same amount as
the decline in C (τ) as the split becomes relatively more eﬃcient. Thus, holding τ ﬁxed, the direct
eﬀect of eﬃciency gains works to the disadvantage of the buyer. Furthermore, since the expected
proﬁti n c r e a s e sf o rt y p e sθ ≥ τ, the incentive rents received by lower types must also increase. In
fact, since H (τ,τ) increases when C (τ)d e c l i n e s ,w ec a ns e et h a tt h ep r i c eo ﬀered by types θ<τ
increases. This implies that the indirect strategic eﬀect also works to the disadvantage of the buyer.
Finally, note that variations in the threshold τ are associated with both of the above eﬀects
s i n c er e n t sa n dc o s te ﬃciency depend on τ. When there exists a threshold value, necessarily below
θr,a tw h i c ht h es u ﬃciency condition holds then we know that the buyer beneﬁts by paying a lower
expected price as compared to a unit auction.
Supplier (interim) proﬁts vary with the type θ and we will focus on conditions under which all








.D r a w i n g o n t h e a b o v e
discussion for the case of τ>θ r, it is obvious from the comparison of equilibrium prices that a unit
auction provides lower interim proﬁts when τ>θ r. In addition, the proﬁt inequality remains strict
at τ = θr and, by continuity, this must extend to a range of threshold values below θr.W et h e r e f o r e
have the following result.
13Proposition 3 Consider the interim proﬁts for suppliers of Π(θ,θ) for the threshold θ (i.e., winner-
take-all format), and Π(θ,τ) for the threshold τ.L e tθr b et h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt o( 1 0 ) .T h e n :








whenever τ ≥ τ∗.
2. If
1−F(θ)






















We begin with point 2, as point 1 was discussed above. In words, the suﬃcient condition is that
the threshold type of τ earns a higher proﬁt than in a unit auction. The greater the eﬃciency gain
from the split, as given by the size of the cost diﬀerential H (τ,τ), the more likely it is that this is
the case. Given a positive proﬁtd i ﬀerential for τ,w ek n o wt h a ta l ll o w e rc o s tt y p e se a r nt h es a m e
positive diﬀerential.
For high cost types, the proﬁtd i ﬀerential varies with θ. The hypothesis in point 2 involves a
relatively mild regularity condition on the distribution and the cost function. This ensures that the
proﬁtd i ﬀerential, which is positive for types τ and θ, remains positive over the high cost range.
For reference, note that the regularity condition is automatically satisﬁed in the familiar case of
multiplicative cost uncertainty.
A stronger version of point 2 is provided by point 3, as supplier proﬁts now decline (uniformly
in type) as the threshold rises. Under this suﬃcient condition, declines in award probabilities will
oﬀset the higher prices associated with a rising threshold. For example, with an increasing hazard
for F, the right hand side is increasing; with C (θ)=cθ for c<1/2, the left hand side is decreasing.
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 provide the conditions for a Pareto improvement relative to a
unit auction benchmark. To summarize, the buyer beneﬁts when a relatively low price in the split
region oﬀsets relatively high prices in the sole-source region. Low-cost suppliers beneﬁtf r o mh i g h
sole-source prices and, due to eﬃciency gains at the split, high cost suppliers also beneﬁt despite the
relatively low split price.
4.3 Auction Format and Reserve Prices
Consider the implications of the above Pareto improvement for the buyer’s procurement decision.
We begin with the choice of auction format and then consider brieﬂy the potential for reserve prices.
Relative to the winner-take-all format, the buyer prefers a split-award auction with a low thresh-
old, below θr (Proposition 2). A natural concern for the buyer is that suppliers may ﬁnd a high-
threshold equilibrium to be focal with respect to proﬁts. In this regard, we see from Proposition
3 that thresholds near θ have relatively low proﬁts for suppliers. It is also worth noting that no
speciﬁc threshold can be focal for suppliers in the sense of equilibrium Pareto dominance with re-
14spect to proﬁta c r o s sa l lt y p e s . 9 The example, however, revealed that it is possible for a speciﬁc
high threshold to proﬁt dominate a low threshold in a pairwise comparison. To the extent the buyer
then expects the suppliers to play the high threshold equilibrium, a winner-take-all format becomes
preferable for the buyer.
Consider the potential for a reserve price in these circumstances. With a winner-take-all format,
a reserve price below θ will reduce the expected payment for the buyer, but the prospect of making no
award, which may involve a high opportunity cost in a procurement context, increases in probability
as the reserve price falls. In contrast, with a split-award format the reserve price will truncate the
set of bidding equilibria, as the reserve price eﬀectively substitutes for supporting sole-source prices.






will leave low threshold equilibria
intact and the split price to the buyer is limited while the loss associated with no procurement is
avoided.10
In sum, these welfare comparisons provide an evaluation of split-award auctions in terms of price
performance. While price is clearly a crucial dimension, it is important to point out that additional
factors such as maintaining a supplier base, innovation and investment incentives, and incumbency
advantages, must be considered in a number of procurement applications.11 With respect to a full
policy evaluation, our welfare results are intended to provide guidance in relation to the price and
proﬁtd i m e n s i o n .
5 Bidding Data
In this section, we examine bidding data for a split-award procurement conducted by the U. S.
Department of Defense. The novel feature of the data is that we have the actual submitted bid
prices from the suppliers for the full range of split quantities, as well as the observed buyer award
choice. Typically, publicly available data only includes information on bidder identity, price and
quantity for the award outcome. With the full set of submitted bid prices, we are able to examine
the buyer’s award choice in relation to the full set of procurement options and assess how each
supplier chose to structure bid prices across sole-source and split quantities. To be sure, we must be
9T h er e a s o ni st h a tl o wc o s ta n dh i g hc o s tt y p e sh a v ed i ﬀerent price-probability tradeoﬀs. For instance, if all low
cost types relative to some θ
∗ ﬁnd θ
∗ to be Pareto dominant, π (θ,θ
∗) ≥ π (θ,x)f o ra l lθ ∈ [θ,θ





then the high cost types near θ
∗ will prefer a lower threshold to θ
∗.T h u s ,n os p e c i ﬁc bidding equilibrium, including
those with a high threshold, is focal in this regard.
10Under limited commitment, reserve price strategies can be problematic because the ‘threat’ not to procure above
the reserve price needs to be credible. A limited procurement budget, perhaps set by a third party such as Congress
in the case of defense procurement, may work towards mitigating this problem.
11For example, Riordan [25] examines supplier qualiﬁcation and selection in a setting where investment in cost
reduction, posterior to the award decision, generates a scale economy. Anton and Yao [1] point out that ex ante
investment incentives can be stimulated by the downstream proﬁt potential in a split award format. Greenstein [13]
provides empirical results regarding incumbency advantages in computer procurement by the federal government; see
also Marshall, Meurer and Richard [18] on federal computer procurement and litigation settlements.
15careful with interpretation as we only have these bids for a sample of one procurement auction.12
Year 1
Split % 0 13.7 27.5 35.8 40.5
A’s bid - 80.46 148.23 185.49 201.96
B’s bid 523.53 463.59 403.92 367.2 354.51
Total
Price
523.53 544.05 552.15 552.69 556.47
Year 1 (continued)
Split % 45.6 54.2 59.5 64.1 72.5 86.3 100
A’s bid 220.32 248.13 265.41 281.07 309.96 355.59 403.92
B’s bid 324.0 289.44 262.71 244.62 210.06 144.45 -
Total
Price
544.32 537.57 528.12 525.69 520.02 500.04 403.92
Year 2
Split % 0 17 34 50 66 83 100
A’s bid 0 118.53 193.86 267.57 340.47 406.35 480.33
B’s bid 484.38 418.23 350.73 280.53 207.09 131.22 0
Total
Price
484.38 536.76 544.59 548.1 547.56 537.3 480.33
Year 3
Split % 0 28.6 42.9 57.1 71.4 100
A’s bid 0 146.07 193.86 242.73 293.76 391.23
B’s bid 381.51 283.5 234.09 186.03 135.54 0
Total
Price
381.51 429.57 427.95 428.76 429.3 391.23
The data is for 3 annual rounds of a procurement auction. The buyer is the U. S. Department of
Defense, the bidders are two large, well-known defense contractors, and the item being procured is
a missile. In each year, the buyer speciﬁed a set of quantities and solicited a bid from each supplier.
Each bid speciﬁed a set of prices, with one price for each of the speciﬁed quantities. To maintain
12The data were obtained as a result of discussions with procurement oﬃcials who had expressed concerns that they
were being ‘gamed’ by the suppliers. In addition, there are many well-known complicating factors including dynamic
cost eﬀects (learning curve) as well as quality, reliability, and delivery. Thus, we will conﬁne ourselves to an examination
of the bidding structure.
16conﬁdentiality, the bidders are labeled A and B, the quantities (splits) are expressed as a percentage
of the total annual award, and prices have been multiplied by a constant (converted to millions of
2005 dollars).13 For reference, each total annual award was well over 1000 missiles; Years 2 and 3
had the same quantity while Year 1 was about 75% of that level. The ‘bold’ entry in each of the
tables below is the award selected by the buyer, with a typical total payment in the neighborhood
of 500 million dollars.
To read the table, each entry for a bidder shows the total price the bidder oﬀered for the
corresponding quantity (split) and the buyer can choose any pair of prices under a split to obtain the
total quantity. Thus, in Year 1, Bidder A oﬀers to supply the split quantity of 13.7% (of the total)
at a price of 80.46 (million dollars). If the buyer were to choose the split of 13.7%, then A produces
13.7% for a payment of 80.46, B produces the residual of 86.3% for a payment of 463.59, and the
buyer pays 544.05 in total. Sole-source awards for A and B correspond to the entries at 100% and
0%, respectively.
Several features of the bids stand out. In all years and for all bids, the unit price declines with
quantity. Bids are uniformly declining over time.14 In Year 1, Bidder A is more aggressive than B,
but this reverses by Year 3. This is reﬂected in the award sequence as A’s share declines from 86.3%
to 66% to 42.9%. In each year, the buyer chooses an interior split rather than a sole-source award.
Note that in Year 1, the buyer chose 86.3% and paid 500.0, passing up the option of a sole-source
award to A and a saving of 500 - 403.9 = 96.915
This revealed preference suggests strongly that the buyer attaches some extra value to an interior
split versus a sole-source outcome. How would the bidders respond if this were common knowledge?
Consider, then, our model of a split-award auction with the modiﬁcation that the buyer has pref-
erences given by payoﬀso f( V − p) for a sole-source award with payment p and (V + k − ˆ p)f o rt h e
split award with payment ˆ p. That is, the buyer enjoys an added surplus of k from splitting the award
(even though total quantity is the same).16
Proposition 1 extends directly to cover this case. We can redeﬁne the surplus measure to be





13Bidder A is the original developer and Bidder B received a transfer of technology from A to enable production.
A tt h et i m eo ft h eﬁrst round of bidding, A had prior production experience of approximately one year’s worth of
(subsequent) annual production while B had only produced about 15% of A’s volume. Lyons [17] provides an excellent
discussion of defense procurement practices, especially with regard to missile programs.
14T h i si sc o m m o na n do f t e nt a k e na sevidence of learning curve eﬀects. See Lyons [17] for a careful empirical study
of procurement costs with a sample of missile procurement programs.
15According to procurement oﬃcials, the bidders were aware that while price would be a very important consideration
other factors could also inﬂuence the award choice. This is always true of competitive defense procurement.
16Brusco and Lopomo [7] have obtained a similar result in their model of a multi-unit auction when bidders have a
common synergy value across units. Although we will not explore them here, several reasons for such a buyer preference
have been noted in the literature on defense procurement. One example is distributive political beneﬁts from having
two active suppliers.
170. The resulting equilibrium is given by the bidding functions
Pτ














Σ,k if θ ≥ τ.
(12)
The proof of Proposition 1 can be adapted to obtain the following.










,w h e r ePτ
Σ,k is given by (11) and Pτ is
given by (12), is a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium.
Clearly, the high cost types (above τ)e a c hl i f tt h e i rs p l i tp r i c eb yk while low cost types (below τ)
raise their sole-source price by a variable amount depending on how likely they are to receive a sole-
source award. Note that the buyer preference reﬂected in k is not equivalent to each bidder having
lower costs by the amount k. In our basic model (k ≡ 0), it is not an equilibrium outcome for the
buyer to choose a split award when then the submitted bids have a minimum price at a sole-source
award. With k>0, however, it is readily veriﬁed that the equilibrium bids can result in realizations
with sole-source prices below the split prices and the buyer choosing a split award. Intuitively, the
buyer preference provides the bidders with an opportunity to leverage their bids upward. In the
simpler case of complete information, the above result reduces to an increase of k at each bidders
sole-source and split price.
With this bidding perspective in hand, let us return to the data. Recall that in year 1, Bidder
Ao ﬀered a very low sole-source price while B did not and the buyer chose an interior split at 86.3%,
passing up the savings from sole-sourcing with A. Perhaps A was bidding aggressively in the hope
of obtaining a sole-source award; on the other hand, it may be that Bidder B is being very cautious
due to a lack of experience. Whatever the reason, when we turn to Year 2 we see that both bidders
now oﬀer low sole-source prices relative to the combined prices at interior splits. The variation in
total price across interior splits is also much smaller than in Year 1. In Year 3 this pattern is even
stronger and the price variation across splits is now almost nil.
The interpretation suggested by the equilibrium is that both bidders are pursuing a form of
the ‘bid to lose’ strategy. Speciﬁcally, they both are padding their sole-source price and split prices
relative to costs to account for the buyer’s split preference. The award pattern moves strongly
toward equal division from Year 1 to 3. Also, consistent with this view, Bidder A clearly becomes
less aggressive as we move to Year 3.17 The equilibrium model provides a foundation for this bidding
behavior (implicit collusion in the non-cooperative sense) in which prices at the splits sustain the
incentive to avoid undercutting to a sole-source award, (i.e., the ‘bid to lose’ incentive) and at the
same time capture the buyer’s added surplus from the split.
17Note that with knowledge of their own bid and public information on the selected award, a bidder can compare
their own sole-source price to the observed outcome; there is no need to observe the opponent’s bid prices to infer that
t h eb u y e ri sw i l l i n gt oap a yap r e m i u mf o rt h es p l i t .
186C o n c l u s i o n
We derived equilibrium bids for a split-award auction for a setting in which the range of uncertainty
regarding cost scale economies is large and each type of award is eﬃcient over diﬀerent ranges of cost
realizations. In equilibrium, low cost suppliers separate and receive a sole-source award while high
cost suppliers pool at a common split price and receive a split award. Whenever the equilibrium
involves a split of the total award, it is the eﬃcient choice. Sole-source awards, however, occur too
often relative to a ﬁrst-best setting. We also identiﬁed when a split-award format can yield a Pareto
improvement relative to a winner-take-all unit auction benchmark and we assessed the price and
eﬃciency properties of split-award auctions in relation to the full commitment benchmark provided
by an optimal auction. Finally, our examination of submitted bids for a defense procurement provided
conﬁrming evidence of coordination on split-award outcomes.
19Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . As a preliminary observation, observe that under the proposed strategies
all types (except θ who makes zero proﬁt in the equilibrium with τ = θ) make a positive expected













≥ 0i se q u i v a l e n tt oτ ≥ θm.T h u s , i t
does not pay to deviate announcing bids that ensure that the ﬁrm never participates in production.
We now show that (Pτ,Pτ
Σ)d e ﬁned in (6) and (7) is a best response when the opponent is also
using (Pτ,Pτ
Σ). By construction, Pτ is increasing, strictly on the interval (θ,τ), and continuous;
Pτ
Σ is constant, and Pτ (θ)=2 Pτ
Σ for each θ ≥ τ. Consider bidder A of type θ, who has to decide a
bid (p,pΣ). The set of all feasible bids can be divided in two categories:
1. if pΣ+Pτ
Σ >p , then the buyer never chooses Σ, and A can only win a sole-source award, which
occurs when Pτ (θB) >p ; call such a bid a sole-source deviation;
2. if pΣ +Pτ
Σ ≤ p, then A can only win a split award, which occurs when Pτ (θB) ≥ pΣ +Pτ
Σ;c a l l
this a split deviation.
We can, without loss of generality, restrict the choice of p in [Pτ (θ),Pτ
Σ + pΣ]a n ds i m i l a r l y
we can restrict pΣ in a split deviation to the interval
£







. Given the de-
ﬁnition of Pτ,w eh a v ePτ ¡
θ
¢
= Pτ (τ)=2 Pτ
Σ, so that the relevant interval for the split de-
viation is [Pτ (θ) − Pτ
Σ,P τ
Σ]. Since Pτ is continuous and strictly increasing over (θ,τ), for each
p ∈ [Pτ (θ), 2Pτ
Σ) in a sole-source deviation there is a unique θp ∈ [θ,τ) such that p = Pτ (θp).
Similarly, pΣ in a split deviation has a unique θs ∈ [θ,τ)w i t hpΣ = Pτ(θs) − Pτ
Σ.D e ﬁne
pτ
Σ (θ)=Pτ(θ) − Pτ
Σ.
Taking θp and θs as choice variables, we ﬁrst show that each type θ ∈ [θ,τ) maximizes expected






Σ (θs) − C (θ)][1 − F (θs)] if Pτ (θp) ≥ Pτ
Σ + pτ
Σ (θs)
(Pτ (θp) − θ)(1− F (θp)) if Pτ (θp) <Pτ
Σ + pτ
Σ (θs).
Consider ﬁrst the set of announcements (θp,θ s) such that Pτ (θp) <P τ
Σ + pτ
Σ (θs). If the optimal
announcement is in this set, then
U (θp,θ s|θ)=[ Pτ (θp) − θ][1− F (θp)], (13)










[1 − F (θp)] − [Pτ (θp) − θ]f (θp)=( θ − θp)f (θp).
We conclude that the unique maximum over this set is θp = θ and observe that, since θ<τ ,t h e
announcement (θ,τ) maximizes utility over this set. Next, suppose that the optimal announcement
(θp,θ s) is such that
Pτ (θp) − Pτ
Σ >p τ
Σ (θs),
and notice that this is possible only if θs <τ . We will show that this gives a lower utility than
announcing (θ,τ). The expected utility is
U (θp,θ s|θ)=[ Pτ (θs) − Pτ
Σ − C (θ)][1 − F (θs)].
Using the deﬁnition of Pτ we obtain
U (θp,θ s|θ)=[ θs − Pτ
Σ − C (θ)][1 − F (θs)] + H (τ,τ)[1− F (τ)] +
Z τ
θs
(1 − F (x))dx. (14)




Σ − [θs − C (θ)]) f (θs),
is positive for θs <Pτ




s = τ + C (θ) − C (τ). (15)
Notice that θ<θ ∗
s <τ.T h eﬁrst inequality follows from the fact that θ<τand the function C is
increasing, while the second follows from the fact that θ −C (θ) is increasing. Plugging the value θ∗
s
from (15) into the value of the expected utility (14) we obtain
U (θp,θ∗




(1 − F (x))dx. (16)
We want to show that
U (θp,θ∗
s|θ) < [Pτ (θ) − θ][1− F (θ)]. (17)
Using the deﬁnition of Pτ (θ)a n dU (θp,θ∗




(1 − F (x))dx <
Z τ
θ
(1 − F (x))dx
which is satisﬁed because θ∗
s >θand the argument of the integral is positive. This completes the
proof that the prescribed bidding strategy is optimal for types θ ∈ [θ,τ).
Consider now a type θ ≥ τ. First notice that the prescribed strategy is optimal among all
announcements (p,pΣ) such that pΣ + Pτ
Σ ≤ p. Any price for the split award higher than Pτ
Σ yields
ap r o ﬁt of zero. On the other hand, consider a lower price and let pΣ (θs) <P τ
Σ. In this case the
21expected utility is given by (14), and since now θ ≥ τ we have that the expected utility is strictly
increasing in θs over the interval [θ,τ]. Thus, selecting θs = τ,i . e . pΣ (θs)=PΣ, is optimal. The
only thing left to show is that for any announcement (p,pΣ) such that pΣ + PΣ >pthe expected
utility is inferior to [PΣ − C (θ)][1 − F (τ)].
For any announcement in this class the expected utility can be written as in (13), with θp ≤ τ.
Using the same logic as above we have
∂U (θp,θ s|θ)
∂θp
=( θ − θp)f (θp).
Since now θ ≥ τ, this means that the derivative is strictly positive for each θp <τ . Therefore, the
optimal choice in this class of announcements is θp = τ. Thus, we have to show
[PΣ − C (θ)][1 − F (τ)] ≥ [Pτ (τ) − θ][1− F (τ)].
Using Pτ (τ)=2 PΣ =2( τ − C (τ)) the inequality becomes equivalent to
θ − C (θ) ≥ τ − C (τ)
which is satisﬁed because θ − C (θ) is increasing and θ ≥ τ. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .L e tFτ ≡ F (τ)a n dCτ ≡ C (τ). Using (8) we can compute
























is a lower bound on the integral. This implies









2(τ − Cτ) − θ
¤
.
For τ>θ r the bracketed term on the right in positive. Hence, τ<θ r is necessary. For the suﬃcient
condition, note that θ =
R θ
τ 1dx + τ and collect terms. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .W ep r o v ep o i n t1ﬁrst. Let ∆(θ) ≡ Π(θ,τ) − Π(θ,θ), and let τ ∈ (θr,θ).
The claim is immediate for low cost types since ∆(θ)=∆(τ)f o rθ<τand
∆(τ)=H (τ,τ)(1− Fτ) −
Z θ
τ
[1 − F (x)]dx > (1 − Fτ)
£
H (τ,τ) − θ + τ
¤
> 0,
where the last step follows from τ>θ r. For high cost types, we have
∆(θ)=H (τ,θ)(1− Fτ) −
Z θ
θ
[1 − F (x)]dx > (1 − Fτ)H (τ,θ) − [1 − F (θ)](θ − θ).
Since 1 − F (θ) is decreasing, θ − C (θ) is increasing, and C (θ) is increasing, we have ∆(θ) >
[1 − Fτ]
£
2(τ − Cτ) − θ
¤





22τ ∈ (θr,θ). The proﬁt inequality is also strict when τ = θr, and it is identically zero at τ = θ.T h u s ,
by continuity of the proﬁt functions, the strict proﬁt inequality holds for τ in some neighborhood of
the form (θ0,θ)w h e r eθ0 is strictly less than θr.
Now consider point 2. From (9), the suﬃcient condition in point 2 implies ∆(τ) > 0. From
above, we know ∆(θ)=∆(τ)f o rθ<τ . This leaves the case of high cost types, θ>τ .B y




< 0. It is easy to check that, under the regularity condition, ∆0 (θ) crosses 0 exactly once









.F r o ma b o v ew ek n o w




= H(τ,θ)[1 − Fτ] > 0. The claim then follows directly.
For point 3, calculate ∂Π(θ,x)/∂x for high cost and low cost types, noting that Π(θ,x)h a sa
kink when θ = x. Under the suﬃcient condition, the partial is negative at x for all types, and the
claim in 3 follows directly. ¥
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